



*GCEP Workshop on Fission Energy
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Avenues in Computational Design and Safety of Nuclear Reactors

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Contents

➤ **The Industry's Practice, Trend and Needs**


➤ **The Enabling Technology**

Four Instruments of the Next-Generation Toolkit

➤ **The Implementation Challenges**

Decision Making in Nuclear Industry

$$R = P \times C$$
$$(0) \times (0)$$



VS.



Experiments (Scaling)

Simulation-Based Learning

Large Uncertainties

2-3 Generations

Full-Scale Testing


Trials-and-Errors

Statistics Available

Generations

In Silico Evolution of Nuclear Power



Computational Nuclear Reactor Engineering



Intellectual Values and Technologies

Current Practice

++ Improved Tools



Reactor Core Neutron Kinetics


- governing equations – 3D neutron kinetics
- simulate detail power distribution inside reactor core

Primary System Thermal-Hydraulics

- governing equations – 1D two-phase fluid flow
- simulate response of the entire plant

Current Practice

-- Validated Codes ...vs... Invalid Calculations





Strategy:
Divide-and-Conquer


Strategy:
Conservatism

Both strategies become increasingly inadequate

Conservatism vs. Evolving Nature of Safety Threats



Benign looks are often treacherous







The Practice

✦ Industry practice: safety analysis, *licensing*, regulation


❑ “Best-Estimate” Coupled NK-TH System Codes

❑ Probabilistic Risk Analysis (PRA)

❖ *Computational Fluid Dynamics (CFD)*



The Trend



The Needs

✚ Industry practice: safety analysis, licensing, regulation

✚ Confidence in reactor safety margins

✚ Predictability of rare events

✚ Optimal and reliable performance

✚ New quality in reactor performance



The Challenges

Responding to the Challenges: New Generation Toolkit

- ✚ Industry practice: safety analysis, licensing, regulation
- ✚ Confidence in reactor safety margins
 - **Class I: Advanced Accident Simulation Codes**
- ✚ Predictability of rare events
 - **Class II: Search Engine**
- ✚ Optimal and reliable performance
 - **Class III: Plant “Fingerprint” and Total Diagnostics**
- ✚ New quality in reactor performance
 - **Class IV: Micro-scale Control**

Class I: Advanced Accident Analysis Codes

➤ *for High-Fidelity Quantification of Safety Threats*

✚ Predictive Capability

❖ Physics-based

- ❑ Fundamentally well-posed hyperbolic, conservative models, that ensure objectivity

❖ Multi-scale treatment

- ❑ Adaptive model refinement

❖ Parallelized computation. Nonlinear, implicit solvers

➤ “DNA” free of basic diseases

❖ Scenario-driven (licensing)

❖ No numerical convergence.

❖ Flow regime maps tailored to certain DBA


❖ Hard-wired models

❖ Methods/platforms/solvers of the 1960s-1980s.


- ❑ Compensation of errors

➤ “Lego” body.



“Gap-Tooth” Simulation Platform for Reactor Analysis




A)




B)



C)




D)



Computational saving: $10^2 \dots 10^4$

Nuclear Renaissance



❖ Major advances in technology


- ✓ Reduced number of components
- ✓ Passive safety features

❖ Evolutionary design

❖ Core Damage Frequency (CDF)

$(10^{-7} \dots 10^{-8})/\text{reactor} \cdot \text{year}$.

Natural Circulation-Driven
Operation and Safety



Safety Analysis of Advanced Passive Plants

- ❖ Natural circulation is delicate, 3D
- ❖ Two-phase and multi-component (air/H₂/steam) NC ... → complex.
- ❖ 3D TH vs. 1D and 0D models
- ❑ New systems, lack PRA insights
- ❑ Process-controlled failures (vs. equipment-related failures)
- ❑ *Need a New Way to Characterize and Analyze Passive Systems*

✦ Quantification:

... **less** valves,
... **more** physics

◆ Uncertainty:


... **reduce** aleatory
... **increase** epistemic

Ⓜ **Conservation Law**


(Conservation of Headache)

Class II: Search Engine


➤ to Identify Plant Vulnerability and Potentially Risk-Significant Sequences



Probabilistic Roadmap



Deterministic Vehicle



Class III: Plant Fingerprint and Total Diagnostics

➤ *to Achieve Optimal and Reliable Performance*


- ✚ “Fingerprinting”:
 - ◆ core power (neutron), flow (T, P, u, c)
 - ✚ spatio-temporal fluctuations (n, T, P, u, vibrations)

□ Computational characterization of the plant’s operating regimes (incl. slight variations)
HNT, CFD, FSI



□ Consistent with the plant’s monitoring system and diagnostic techniques

➤ **Detect Problems before They Actually Become Ones.**




Smooth Run

Fuel performance
... in TH.

Exploiting the Diagnostic Value of “Noises”

The Enabling Technology



Years of the plant operation with no surprise.

Ability to handle "event" expeditiously when it strikes ...

Synergistic Use of Tools to Effectively Manage Rare “Events”


The New-Generation Tools enable

- ✚ High-quality analysis of the plant behavior during the event
- ✚ Sound understanding of consequences of other “what-ifs”
- ✚ Analysis of options and making decision on corrective measures
- ✚ Common understanding with, and acceptance by, the regulator
- ✚ Putting the authority and the public at ease

➤ Safety & \$\$\$


Class IV: Microscale Control to Leapfrog Reactor Performance

“There’s Plenty of Room at the Bottom”, Richard P. Feynman (1959)



- ✚ **Microphysics (microhydrodynamics, nucleation, inter-molecular forces, coolant-surface wettability, crud deposition, coolant chemistry, radiation-induced surface activation, etc.) governs reactor performance.**

Computational and Experimental Nanotechnology



Overall Assessment of Need and Impact

	Class I “accident analysis”	Class II “search engine”	Class III “fingerprint & diagnostics”	Remarks
Urgency of the development	Very High	High	Medium	ALWR
	High	Low	No	Others
Live without it in <i>near term</i>	No	Yes	Yes	2015 - # ALWRs in operation
Live without it in <i>mid term</i>	—	No	Yes	2025
Live without it in <i>long term</i>	—	—	No	> 2025 - ## ALWRs in operation
Impact – on Safety	Very High	High	Medium	
Impact - on Economic	High (<i>regulation</i>)	High (<i>regulation</i>)	Very High (<i>reliability</i>)	


The Implementation Challenges

	Class I “accident analysis”	Class II “search engine”	Class III “fingerprint & diagnostics”	Remarks
Readiness of methodology	Medium	Low	Medium	Theory, math models, algorithms
Readiness of supporting knowledge	Low	Very Low	Medium	I : Physical closures II: Equipment data III: Plant operation data
Readiness of technology	Medium	Low	Low <i>(diagnostics)</i>	Computing power
Opposing factors/forces	Comfort <i>(industry-reg.)</i>	Divided D-P communities	Preparedness of workforce	Inertia over two decades of “conservation”
Essential Supplements	Experiments	DPRA Model/Data	Diagnostic Techniques	Investment
Maturation	10 years	15-20 years	10-15 years	Industry, NRC, International collaboration


Experimental Support

Fundamental, Locally-Scaled Experiments w/ Advanced Diagnostics

Anatomy of Droplet Explosion





Anatomy of Boiling at High Heat Flux



Advanced Codes
Require New Class of
Sub-grid-scale Models
and Detailed Data

Synchronous High-Speed Imaging Photo- (100kfps) and X-ray (10kfps)



Synchronous High-Speed Imaging Photo-, X-Ray and IR (20kfps)

Concluding Remarks

- ❖ Due to economic and safety requirements, the plant safety technology has become increasingly complex ... *even when it looks simpler*.
- ❖ The key to the plant's economic and safe operation is in managing the complexity of *rare*, but potentially high-consequence "events".
- ❖ Due to the multi-faceted nature and different focus of plant operation in normal and abnormal regimes, *panoply* of analysis tools is needed.
- ❖ *Timely* investment in Computational Safety has far-reaching impact.

Thank You.